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Abstract 
In this paper we show that firm characteristics have an influence on the success of employ-
ment subsidies e.g. wage subsidies and in-work benefits, as they can strengthen positive ef-
fects or mitigate negative effects. We consider firm characteristics as post treatment variables, 
which are realised after the (placement officer’s or the unemployed job seeker’s) decision re-
garding programme participation has taken place. Therefore in a first step we estimate pair-
wise treatment effects by propensity score matching, controlling for pre-treatment character-
istics of the treated and control individuals only. In a second step as a methodological contri-
bution we propose a decomposition of the pairwise treatment effects using an Oaxaca/Blinder 
style decomposition analysis on the matched samples. In this decomposition we include the 
post-treatment firm characteristics as explanatory variables. Because employment status is a 
binary outcome variable in our empirical application, we use a generalisation of the decompo-
sition analysis to nonlinear regressions developed by Fairlie (2005). This procedure allows us to 
distinguish between the part of a treatment effect that is due to differences in firm character-
istics between treated and controls (the “explained” part) and the part that is independent of 
those differences (the “unexplained” part). 
 
JEL classification: J38, C25, C14 
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1 Introduction 
One major aim of programmes of active labour market policy (ALMP) is the labour market in-
tegration of unemployed people who are having difficulties finding a job on their own. For 
political decision makers it is of relevance whether a certain programme is successful in 
achieving this aim compared to either a different programme or implementing no programme 
at all. From a microeconomic perspective, an instrument of active labour market policy can be 
regarded as successful if the person receiving the subsidy succeeds better than he or she 
would have done without support or with a different kind of support. A measurement of suc-
cess which is commonly used is the length of the (non-)subsidised employment relationship 
and the length of time that the person is not dependent on unemployment benefits.  
The typical strategy for evaluating the success of ALMP is to compare two groups of individu-
als with similar characteristics on average, one group receiving the treatment (i.e. participat-
ing in a programme) and the control group receiving no treatment (see e.g. Heckman et al. 
1999), receiving a different treatment (see e.g. Lechner 2001) or receiving a treatment at a 
later point in time (Sianesi 2004). Usually these characteristics are the individual’s socio-
demographic background (age, sex, nationality, health status), qualification level (formal quali-
fications, work experience), employment history (unemployment duration, past programme 
participation), the regional context as well as rules of eligibility (Caliendo et al. 2004, 2005; 
Fitzenberger et al. 2006; Lechner, Wunsch 2006; Lechner et al. 2005).  
However, it is not only the individual’s characteristics that can influence the success of ALMP 
in integrating unemployed people into employment. Employment stability in general is also 
dependent on the firm and its characteristics (for an overview see e.g. Abraham 2005). Accord-
ing to labour market segmentation theory (Doeringer, Piore 1971) for example, large firms 
provide working conditions that have a positive effect on employment stability, e.g. through 
job ladders, grievance procedures and what is known as an internal labour market. The effect 
of the establishment size on job tenure has been confirmed in empirical analysis (e.g. Rebitzer 
1986). In addition, large firms can bear unused resources (organisational slack) to a higher 
degree (Cyert, March 1963), and therefore can afford to employ individuals who only reach the 
desired productivity after some time of settling-in.  
If such firm characteristics are distributed randomly across participants in different pro-
grammes and non-participants, this poses no problem for ALMP evaluation. However, this 
seems not always to be the case. For example, Bellmann et al. (2006) show that whether es-
tablishments make use of certain kind of workfare jobs, so called “one-euro-jobs”, varies by 
industry sectors and establishment size. Hartmann (2004) points out that usage of wage sub-
sidies positively depends on firm characteristics like firm size and economic development.  
If random distribution is not the case, the question arises as to whether the relative success of 
a labour market programme is due to the programme itself or due to differences in the charac-
teristics of employing firms. This question can be of practical relevance if a positive evaluation 
IAB-Discussion Paper 18/2008 6 
led to the programmes being implemented more often than before, which could mean that the 
composition of the employing firms might change.  
Of course, one could consider comparing not only treatment and control groups with similar 
individual characteristics but also with similar firm characteristics. The implicit assumption 
however would be that firm characteristics influence treatment participation. This means that 
the employing firm is predetermined before the individual’s decision to accept a subsidy is 
taken, which is an indicator for a deadweight loss (Calmfors 1994). However, we think that at 
least for some programmes there is a strong argument to be made for assuming firm charac-
teristics to be endogenous in the sense that they are post-treatment variables, i.e. already 
influenced by the treatment (see Figure 1). 
The theoretical reasoning behind this assumption is that - if programmes work as intended - 
the caseworker’s decision to offer and/or the unemployed job seeker’s decision to accept par-
ticipating in a programme influences what kind of job in what kind of firm will be available 
and acceptable for the unemployed person. Caseworkers would offer a certain kind of subsidy 
and ask the unemployed to consider this in their decision to apply for certain jobs. Accepting a 
subsidy therefore will lead to different job search behaviour and applications to different firms. 
In this case conditioning on firm characteristics would not identify the causal effect (Rosen-
baum 1984). 
Figure 1 
Firm characteristics as post treatment variables 
Individual
Characteristics
Decision to 
participate in 
Program
Outcome
Firm
Characteristics
pre-treatment time of treatment post-treatment
 
 
One group of programmes for which this is of particular importance is employment subsidies, 
because here programme participation coincides with taking up employment. One kind of em-
ployment subsidy is the wage subsidy (see e.g. Layard 1997). It is granted to the unemployed 
but paid to the employing firm and can therefore be termed an employer subsidy. The aim is to 
increase a firm’s incentives to fill a vacancy even though the unemployed candidate’s qualifi-
cation level does not meet the requirements. Therefore the treatment is realised only when the 
individual job-seeker is offered a subsidy by the job placement officer and the firm accepts this 
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unemployed person even despite a lack of qualifications. Let us assume that wage subsidies 
tend to be granted to employees in small firms and evaluation results show that such subsidies 
are effective. As intended, placement officers will grant this subsidy more often based on these 
positive evaluations, and - since the number of small firms is limited - job seekers will now 
apply for jobs in larger firms more often. In this case the success of wage subsidies might de-
cline simply because of the change in the composition of the employing firms. 
In quite a similar way, in-work benefits (e.g. Blundell 2000) as employee subsidies are intended 
to motivate unemployed people to accept low-wage jobs which they would otherwise not have 
accepted. This is done by supplementing the low wage with a financial benefit that raises that 
wage above the reservation wage. Most of the low-wage jobs that are accepted because of a 
financial supplement are situated in different kinds of firms than other jobs which offer a 
wage that is above the individual’s reservation wage even without the additional benefit. Here, 
too, the labour market programme is associated with a specific employment environment that 
can have an influence on the success or failure of the programme.  
So on the one hand, employment stability is central for the success of certain labour market 
programmes and on the other hand, firms and their characteristics have been shown to influ-
ence employment stability. However, the role of the firm in helping or hindering the success of 
ALMP by providing a work environment that promotes employment stability is rather unclear. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we give a short overview of 
the target groups and prior evaluation results of German wage subsidies and in-work benefits. 
This is followed in section 3 by a description of our data and our proposal of a two step proce-
dure of estimating and decomposing treatment effects using a generalisation of the Oaxaca/ 
Blinder decomposition introduced by Fairlie (2005) on the matched samples. In section 4 we 
apply this procedure to analyse the influence of firm characteristics on the success or failure 
of a German wage subsidy, the so-called settling-in allowance (“Eingliederungszuschuss bei 
Einarbeitung”) and a German in-work benefit (the “Mainz model”). This allows us to distinguish 
between the part of the treatment effect that is due to differences in firm characteristics (the 
“explained” part) and the part that is independent of those differences (the “unexplained” 
part). To the best of our knowledge, the decomposition of a treatment effect using a Oaxaca/ 
Blinder or Fairlie decomposition is proposed for the first time1.  
2 German wage subsidies and in-work benefits - target groups 
and evaluation results 
So far labour market programme evaluation indicates that (temporary) wage subsidies might 
be among the more successful active labour market programmes in Germany (ZEW et al. 2006; 
Bernhard et al. 2007; Eichhorst, Zimmermann 2007; Bernhard et al. 2008). In contrast, (tem-
porary) in-work benefits suffer from low participation rates and are found to have at most 
                                               
1  Hohmeyer and Jozwiak (2008) use a Fairlie decomposition to analyse differences in treatment par-
ticipation between East and West Germany. Biewen et al. (2007) use a regression on the matched 
sample to study treatment effect heterogeneity. 
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little effect on the labour market integration of the low skilled or long-term unemployed 
(BMWA 2005, Dann et al. 2002a,b, Kaltenborn, Wielage 2005, Krug 2007; Nivorozhkin et al. 
2006).  
Wage subsidies and in-work benefits are instruments of labour market policy with very similar 
goals2. They both constitute subsidies to employment that are intended to facilitate the labour 
market integration of unemployed people. But they approach different kinds of mismatch 
problems. When the problem is seen in high labour costs in relation to labour productivity, 
wage subsidies are a possible solution. They aim to compensate the low productivity of the 
unemployed applicants and to increase firms’ incentives to hire them. When the problem is 
seen in the reservation wage exceeding market wages, in-work benefits can be proposed. They 
increase the work incentives of the unemployed by covering the gap between the reservation 
wage and the net wage by supplementing the market wage paid by the firm with a benefit.  
Of course there are unemployed people with certain characteristics for whom one type of sub-
sidy may be more appropriate than another. Obviously, wage subsidies are especially helpful 
for the low skilled. Furthermore low labour productivity may also be a problem for qualified 
people who are experiencing long-term unemployment and whose human capital is therefore 
deteriorating, for (qualified) people with serious health problems or people with poor language 
skills (migrants). Younger people might suffer from a lack of work experience despite a high 
qualification. Finally there might be characteristics signalling low productivity to the employer 
regardless of a person’s true abilities. The applicant’s age is one example of this kind of stig-
matisation: older people are associated with less flexibility, less work capacity and lower stress 
resistance than younger workers (Bellmann et al. 2006). 
In-work benefits can be successful if the net wage of given job opportunities does not match 
the reservation wage of the unemployed job candidate. The reservation wage depends posi-
tively on the last earned income and the “generosity” of transfer payments (Bender et al. 
2007). In-work benefits are therefore more suited to older unemployed people with relatively 
high wages in their last jobs (due to seniority wages or long job tenure) and thus high transfer 
payments, to unemployed people with very specific skills, who were formerly employed in 
highly paid jobs or to unemployed people with large households and many children and high 
social security payments. 
However, for certain unemployed people both programmes may be relevant. For example the 
older unemployed were mentioned as a target group for both instruments. After becoming 
unemployed the high reservation wage may be the major obstacle to labour market integration 
and thus in-work benefits might be successful. If the reservation wage exceeds the market 
wage for a longer period, human capital depreciation will become important, so wage subsi-
dies might be more appropriate. Low-skilled unemployed people may have difficulty finding a 
                                               
2  At least this is the case for Germany. For the different use of in-work benefits in Anglo-Saxon and 
other western countries see Eichhorst 2006. 
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job because of a combination of rather low productivity and a relatively high reservation wage 
(Bender et al. 2007). In more concrete terms, if an individual’s reservation wage is € 1000, this 
can be achieved by taking up a low-wage job supplemented by a benefit (low wage € 900 plus 
benefit € 100 = € 1000) or by taking up a high-wage job (€ 1000) for which the employing 
firm receives a subsidy. In both cases the (subsidised) wage does not equal the productivity of 
the previously unemployed worker (€ 900)3. 
Some programmes combine both kinds of subsidy, for example the “Hamburg model”. This 
regional programme showed positive results in a microeconometric evaluation (Pfeifer 2007), 
but there was no answer to the question of whether the payments to the firm or to the em-
ployer are crucial for the successful labour market integration. 
3 Data and method 
In this section we describe the data and the method used to estimate the treatment effects of 
different employment subsidies as well as their decomposition into the parts which are ex-
plained and not explained by firm characteristics. We combine the usual potential outcome 
approach with a parametric decomposition of a logistic regression on the sample constructed 
by means of propensity score matching.  
3.1 Data 
In our analysis we consider two kinds of German labour market measures, a wage subsidy and 
an in-work benefit as well as a control group of people who start employment at a similar 
time and in a similar region but do not receive any kind of subsidy or measure at all. 
The wage subsidy under consideration is the German settling-in allowance, “Eingliederungs-
zuschuss bei Einarbeitung” (EGZ). This is granted to employees who are seen to require some 
training before they can achieve the productivity demanded for a certain job. As a general rule 
the EGZ refunds a maximum of 30 per cent of the wage to the firm for up to 6 months. This is 
then followed by a period of equal duration in which continued employment is mandatory. If a 
subsidised worker is dismissed within this follow-up period for reasons attributable to the 
employer, part of the subsidy has to be refunded. There are also other kinds of EGZ for special 
groups of unemployed people (ZEW et al. 2006; Bernhard et al. 2007).  
We focus on this type of wage subsidy, as the structure of the target group seems most similar 
to the participants in the “Mainz model” (MZM), an in-work benefit which was started as a 
pilot project in certain areas of Rhineland-Palatinate and Brandenburg in 2000 and was ex-
tended to the whole of Germany in May 2002. In the Mainz model the benefit was imple-
                                               
3  We consider temporary subsidies, which aim to increase the productivity of the subsidized workers on 
the job so they will be able to earn their wages when the subsidy period ends. Another effect which 
leads to a successful integration could be a decreasing reservation wage resulting in a downward 
pressure on gross wages. At least one of these changes must take place in order to transform a subsi-
dized job into a non-subsidized employment relationship. 
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mented as a subsidy to social security contributions and was granted for up to 36 months4. 
Eligibility was means tested and mainly based on the applicant starting a new job with wages 
above € 325, whereby the overall household income (including income from this job) had to be 
below certain thresholds (€ 810 for single people). For single people without children the 
benefit decreased as gross wages increased, and amounted to a maximum of € 67. The subsi-
dies and the income threshold were double for households with children and were supple-
mented by additional child benefit (BMWA 2005). In April 2003 the MZM was discontinued 
and replaced by so-called “Mini and Midi Jobs” (Rudolph, 2003). Benefits already granted were 
paid until 2006. A possible indication of the similarity of the target groups is the fact that 
from May 2002 onwards MZM recipients were eligible to receive this kind of wage subsidy in 
addition, although in practice this double subsidy was seldom used. In our analysis we exclude 
these cases of double subsidies5. 
Data on the recipients of wage subsidies in the EGZ, in-work benefits in the MZM and on the 
control persons is drawn from register data which is collected by the Federal Employment Ser-
vices (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) and made available for scientific analysis by the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB) in the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) of which there is 
also a scientific use file (Zimmermann et al. 2007), supplemented with data on job search 
originating from the applicants pool database (BewA). It contains information on socio-demo-
graphic characteristics, receipt of benefits, participation in active labour market programmes, 
job search as well as information about previous and current employment, including gross 
wages. The latter are given as the average gross wage per day in a given employment spell. For 
reasons concerning the validity of our conditional independence assumption (see section 4.1) 
all single-person households6 subsidised by MZM or EGZ who entered employment between 
May 2002, when the parallel subsidisation of MZM recipients with EGZ was first allowed, and 
April 2003, when the MZM was discontinued. The two groups of programme participants are 
supplemented with a random sample of non participants. This gives us approximately 19,500 
wage subsidy recipients, 1,600 in-work benefit recipients and 14,500 non-subsidised employ-
ees. 
                                               
4  Of the entrants to the Mainz model between March 2002 and April 2003 more than 50% were 
granted the benefit for longer than 18 months. 26% of the in-work benefit recipients were granted a 
benefit for up to 6 months and 19% for a duration of between 7 and 12 months (Gewiese et al. 
2004: 23). 
5  This brief information concerning the design of MZM and EGZ makes it clear that these instruments 
differ in many ways, including in such important features as the amount of money granted and the 
subsidy period. All of these differences are potentially important for the comparison of their relative 
success, but we are mainly interested in the firm characteristics. Differences other than the firm 
characteristics will be captured in the unexplained part of the treatment effect. 
6  To qualify for a single person household, individuals had to be listed as single and without children in 
the IEB as well as the BewA. 
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3.2 The matching estimator and its decomposition 
To analyse the effect of firm characteristics on the success of labour market programmes we 
propose the following procedure. In a first step the average treatment effect on the treated is 
estimated by propensity score matching on the individual (pre-treatment) characteristics like 
human capital, socio-demographics, regional background, etc. In the second step we use only 
the sample of matched observations (matched sample) and perform a Oaxaca/Blinder style 
decomposition of the difference in means between treated and controls with regard to the 
post-treatment firm characteristics. Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) developed their method 
for decomposing linear regressions, but our analysis focuses on a binary outcome of the treat-
ment. Therefore we use a variant suitable for nonlinear regressions proposed by Fairlie (2005). 
By performing this decomposition analysis on the matched sample and by using the (post-
treatment) firm characteristics this amounts to a decomposition of the treatment effect with 
regard to these characteristics. As a result we can decompose the treatment effect in two 
parts, a part explained by differences in firm characteristics between treated and controls and 
a part unexplained, i.e. either due to the treatment alone or due to further, unobserved post-
treatment characteristics. 
3.2.1 Step one: Estimating the treatment effect 
We follow the potential outcome framework (Rubin 1974, 2005), extended to the multiple 
treatment case (e.g. Lechner 2001). The potential outcomes are 2,..,0, =kY k  with 0Y  for 
the case of no subsidy. For each individual only one of the K  alternative outcomes can be 
observed. 
The outcome variable of interest here is employment status after 18 months7 (Y ) with 1=Y  
if the individual is still employed in the original firm 18 months after he or she began the (sub-
sidised) employment and 0=Y  otherwise (i.e. if the employment has been terminated). Note 
that we focus on the original employment, so 0=Y  even if the individual is in employment 
again but in a different job8. 
The effect to be estimated is the average treatment effect on the treated ( ATT ). This tells us 
whether individuals who received treatment k  would have fared better or equally well in 
terms of employment stability (after 18 months) with treatment l  )( kl ≠ : 
( )),|(),|(),( XlKYEXkKYEElkATT lkX =−==  (1) 
                                               
7  Our observation period is limited to 24 months. Even though we could estimate monthly treatment 
effects we focus on the effect 18 months after treatment start. This is done mostly for pragmatic rea-
sons of avoiding unmanageable many estimates (four treatment effects and eight decomposition re-
sults for each month). We choose 18 months because it exceeds the combined subsidy and follow up 
period of wage subsidies. Estimates for the monthly treatment effects are available upon request. 
Usually they are rising at the beginning of the employment, start to decline after about the ninth 
month, and sometimes become rather small after 24 months.  
8  This is necessary for the decomposition with regard to the firm characteristics of the subsidized em-
ployment to make sense. In a companion paper we will try to identify from the process data, whether 
persons who quit a (subsidized) job simply moved directly into a different job or into unemployment. 
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Since the outcome variable is binary, the treatment effect is the difference in the probability 
of still being employed in the (originally) subsidised job one and a half years after it started. 
The conditioning on characteristics X  identifies the effect of the treatment if the conditional 
independence assumption holds:  
)|(),|(),|( XYEXlKYEXkKYE lll ==== .  (2) 
X  denotes the individual’s pre-treatment characteristics. According to Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983, 1985) it is sufficient to condition on the propensity score )(XP  as the probability of 
receiving a treatment. Conditioning is done by matching each treatment recipient i to a con-
trol person j with a similar propensity score. In our application, similarity will be based on the 
nearest neighbour method and a calliper of 0.001 is set for the maximum allowed dis-
tance |)()(| ji XPXP − . The single nearest neighbour (without replacement) matching esti-
mator is given by the differences between the means of treatment and control recipients 
(Smith, Todd 2005; Heckman et al. 1998): 
∑ ∑∑
∩∈ ∩∈∩∈
−=
CSDki CSDlj
l
j
CSDkik
k
i
k
Yjiw
N
Y
N
lkTTA ),(11),(ˆ  (3) 
with Dk  and Dl  denoting the set of treatment and control recipients respectively and CS  
the region of common support. kN  is the number of individuals in the set CSDk ∩  and 
),( jiw  is the weight given to observation j  when matched with observation i . Here 
1),( =jiw  if j is the nearest neighbor, and 0),( =jiw  otherwise. 
3.2.2 Step two: Decomposing the treatment effect 
According to our hypothesis, when entering (subsidised) employment the observed individuals 
also enter different kinds of firms with characteristics Z . These characteristics are not part of 
the vector X  because they are not characteristics of the individual and are realised only after 
treatment status has been determined. To analyse the extent to which the estimated effect of 
a subsidy can be attributed to such firm characteristics, we construct a decomposition of the 
treatment effect. For this we perform a decomposition analysis on the matched sample with 
Z  as the independent and Y  as the dependent variable.  
Let us first consider the case of a continuous outcome variable. Then we could use the Oax-
aca/Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973), where, depending on what subgroup 
is chosen as the reference group:  
( )[ ] ( )[ ]lkjkjiljki ZZZYYlkTTA βββ ˆˆˆˆˆ),(ˆ −+−=−=  (4.1) 
or 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]lkjljiljki ZZZYYlkTTA βββ ˆˆˆˆˆ),(ˆ −+−=−= . (4.2) 
   
44342143421
dunexplaine
                        
explained
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Z  denotes the vector of firm characteristics, kβˆ  is the vector of coefficient estimates from a 
linear regression of Y  on Z  in the sample of matched treatment recipients and lβˆ  is the 
vector of coefficient estimates in the sample of matched controls. Because it is performed on 
the matched sample, the decomposition of the difference between the means of the two sub-
groups amounts to a decomposition of the ),(ˆ lkTTA , where (in equation 4.1) ( ) kji ZZ βˆ−   
gives the part explained by firm characteristics and ( )lkjZ ββ ˆˆ −  the unexplained part. It is 
easy to see, that individual characteristics X  should not contribute to the explained part 
treatment effect, because the matching balances their distributions and therefore also their 
means over the two subpopulations and therefore ( )[ ] 0ˆ =− kji XX γ . If included, however, 
the decomposition could - under the usual parametric assumptions - indicate different effects 
of the individual characteristics under treatment or control status (i.e. effect heterogeneity), 
given that lk γγ ˆˆ ≠ : 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]lkjlkjkjikjiljki XZXXZZYYlkTTA γγββγβ ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆˆ),(ˆ −+−+−+−=−= (5) 
Since the outcome of interest in our analysis is binary, i.e. employment status after 18 month, 
we can not use the linear decomposition but have to resort to a generalisation for the nonlin-
ear case proposed by Fairlie (2005). Here, too, each of the two subgroups can be used as the 
reference group leading to either decomposition equation (eq1) or (eq2). So the decomposition 
can be conducted in one of the following ways:  
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dunexplaine
                                                   
explained
                                               
(.)F  stands for a nonlinear function, e.g. the cumulative standard normal or logistic distribu-
tion functions. Again, kN  is the number of treatment recipients in the set CSDk ∩  and lN  
is the number of matched individuals from the control population. Z  is the vector of firm 
characteristics. kβˆ  is the vector of coefficient estimates from a logistic regression of Y  on 
Z  in the sample of matched treatment recipients and lβˆ  is the vector of coefficient esti-
mates in the sample of matched controls.   
In both equations the expression in the first bracket of the right-hand side gives the part of 
the treatment effect explained by the different composition of the two groups with regard to 
variables Z , the second gives the part that remains unexplained. Since results can differ, it is 
prudent to report the results from both variants. Due to the nonlinearity, the order in which 
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the Z  variables enter the calculation of the decomposition can influence the results. The 
nonlinearity of the regressions that are used for the decomposition also implies that the con-
tribution of the individual characteristics X  need not balance each other out, so it might be 
that )ˆ()ˆ()ˆ,ˆ()ˆ,ˆ( kjkikjkjkiki ZFZFXZFXZF ββγβγβ −≠− . Therefore in the em-
pirical analysis (section 4) we also perform a sensitivity check of our results to see if they dif-
fer when we include the individual characteristics.  
We propose this kind of decomposition analysis as a simple alternative to principal stratifica-
tion as put forward by Frangakis and Rubin (2002). Compared to the method of principal 
stratification, the use of a decomposition analysis on the matched sample has both advan-
tages and disadvantages. One advantage is that principal strata of a post treatment variable 
must not be affected by treatment assignment, an exclusion restriction that sometimes is not 
fulfilled (as is the case here). Second, principal stratification becomes highly complex when 
more than one post-treatment variable is considered, whereas the decomposition can easily be 
extended to more than one variable, as is done in this paper. One disadvantage of the decom-
position analysis is however, that the conditional independence assumption has to be ex-
tended towards the post-treatment (firm) characteristics (see Rosenbaum 1984). Another is 
that the decomposition analysis reintroduces parametric assumptions, whereas principal 
stratification remains nonparametric. 
4 Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Estimating the treatment effects 
To achieve conditional independence, it is necessary to cover all of the variables that simulta-
neously determine selection into one of the programmes and employment stability. This leads 
us to focus on single-person households in order to avoid any influence of the household con-
text (partner’s employment status, children to support), which is necessary because benefit 
eligibility in the MZM was based on household income (that is including the partner’s income 
as well as income from other sources) but from the data we only observe individual income 
from employment. Of course this raises the question as to whether the estimated treatment 
effect can be generalised to cover programme participants with other household contexts. 
However, the aim of this paper is not to evaluate in-work benefits and/or wage subsidies per 
se but rather to illuminate the role of firm characteristics in the success or failure of active 
labour market programmes, particularly those which subsidise employment. 
In accordance with the current literature on labour market programme evaluation (Caliendo, 
Hujer et al. 2004; Fitzenberger et al. 2006; Lechner, Wunsch 2006) we cover a wide range of 
covariates. First of all we use age, sex and German citizenship to account for the socio-
demographic background in the logistic regression to compute the propensity scores. Since the 
individual employment history is considered to have a major influence on programme partici-
pation, we include several dummies that indicate whether the individual participated in short-
term training, EGZ, job creation measures (so-called ABM or SAM) or further training at least 
once in the last seven years as well as the number of days in labour market programmes dur-
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ing the same period. In addition we calculated the number of days in employment within the 
last seven years and the duration of the last unemployment spell (with zero indicating no un-
employment immediately prior to the subsidised employment) as well as what kind of social 
security benefit was received immediately prior to programme participation. To take into ac-
count differences in individuals’ propensities to quit a job we included information about who 
terminated the last employment relationship, the employer or the employee him/herself, 
whether it ended under a cancellation agreement or because the job was fixed-term. An im-
portant aspect of our analysis is the influence of firm characteristics on the treatment effect. 
For this reason we included information about the characteristics of the firm in which the 
individual was previously employed, such as the average wage in the firm, the firm size and 
the share of unskilled workers in the firm as well as the wage from the last employment rela-
tionship (see also Fitzenberger et al. 2006). For some of the covariates squares were included 
to enhance the balancing property of the matching procedure. 
In order to take the influence of regional characteristics into account we let two different 
regional classifications enter the logistic regression. Region classification I is according to 
Görmar, Irmen (1991) and is mainly based on population density, classification II is according 
to Blien et al. (2007) and covers the regional labour market context (unemployment rate, va-
cancy rate, etc) of the employment office that granted the subsidy. Since caseworkers often 
have ample scope to offer either of the programmes (or non at all) to a job-seeker, we in-
cluded the caseworker’s assessment of whether the potential participant suffers from health 
problems relevant to job placement, whether he or she has work experience and assessment of 
the job-seeker’s qualification level. The MZM was specifically designed to promote part-time 
jobs, so we also used the desired working time (full-time, part-time or no preference) in the 
logistic regression (For the logistic regressions of treatment and control status see Table 4 in 
the appendix). 
Table 1 gives the respective treatment effects9. The use of single nearest neighbour matching 
without replacement to construct the respective control groups is motivated by the fact that 
the standard errors in the Fairlie decomposition would need adjustment if some observations 
are to be used repeatedly.  
Compared to unsubsidised employees, the wage subsidy has a positive average treatment ef-
fect of 13 percentage points on the probability of employment 18 months after starting the 
job, which is highly significant. Compared to in-work benefits as a different subsidy, the effect 
of wage subsidies is slightly smaller, at 9 percentage points, but still highly significant. In-work 
benefits on the other hand seem not to have any effect on employment stability at all. As need 
not necessarily be the case, a comparison of in-work benefit to wage subsidy recipients yields 
                                               
9  We used the stata supplement psmatch2 (Leuven, Sianesi 2003) for computing the treatment effects, 
mhbounds (Becker, Caliendo 2006) for the Rosenbaum bounds analysis and fairlie (Jann 2007) for the 
decomposition analysis. 
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a negative effect, complementary to the reverse comparison of wage subsidy with in-work 
benefits. 
Table 1 
Pairwise treatment effects 
Balance after matching 
Comparison Treatment effect 
ORp>0.05 or 
ORp<0.05 F-test 
pseu-
do R2 
mean 
s.bias 
Matched 
pairs 
wage subsidy  vs.  no treatment    0.13 *** 1.68 0.76 0.00 0.87 6257 
wage subsidy  vs.  in-work benefit    0.094 *** 1.24 0.88 0.02 3.77 576 
in-work benefit vs. no treatment    0.024 1.11 1.00 0.01 2.68 610 
in-work benefit vs. wage subsidy     -0.115 *** 1.35 0.90 0.02 3.15 547 
Single nearest neighbour matching without replacement and calliper of 0.001; linear propensity score; 
single person households only 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
 
Next to the treatment effect we report the odds ratio on treatment participation necessary for 
an unobserved covariate to account for a significant treatment effect or to account for the 
result that no significant effect was determined (Rosenbaum 2002; Becker, Caliendo 2007). 
We only report the odds ratio necessary for the p-value to exceed the 0.05 level in the case of 
significant treatment effects and the odds ratio necessary to lead to a p-value of under 0.05 
for insignificant treatment effects. Also we give an overview of the balancing property of the 
matching procedure by presenting an F-test of joint insignificance of the covariates in a logis-
tic regression on the matched sample as well as the pseudo R2 and the mean standardised bias 
(Rosenbaum, Rubin 1983).  
As we can see from the Rosenbaum bounds, all of the significant treatment effects are rea-
sonably robust with regard to unobserved heterogeneity. For example in the case of the wage 
subsidy versus no subsidy, an unobserved binary influence would have to raise the odds for 
receiving a wage subsidy by at least 1.68 and simultaneously influence employment stability 
to account for the observed treatment effect. The positive but insignificant effect of the in-
work benefit compared to no subsidy, in contrast, would already be statistically significant if 
there were an unobserved covariate with an odds ratio of 1.11 or higher. For all of the com-
parisons, the matching led to a good balance, as can be seen from the F-test, the pseudo R2 
and the mean standardised bias10. 
All in all we can conclude that firstly, at least for the subgroup of single-person households 
and the two specific programmes that we are analysing, wage-subsidised jobs are more stable 
than non-subsidised jobs or jobs subsidised with an in-work benefit. In-work benefits in con-
trast have no effect on employment stability. The effectiveness of wage subsidise is all the 
more remarkable because we analyse employment status after 18 months, but the maximum 
duration of the wage subsidy including the follow-up period is 12 months whereas the maxi-
                                               
10  Results from bivariate t-tests are shown in the appendix (Table 5). Further balancing tests were con-
ducted and results are available from the authors on request. 
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mum duration of the in-work benefit is 36 months. So after 12 months formerly wage-
subsidised jobs will have passed the market test and are transformed into regular employment 
relations while most jobs in the MZM (in-work benefits) will still be subsidised and it is not 
clear, whether they will continue when the subsidy expires.  
In a next step we will analyse whether differences in firm characteristics can help to explain 
the observed effects of the wage subsidy and the missing effect of the in-work benefit.  
4.2 Decomposing the treatment effects 
Before we proceed to the decomposition of the pair-wise treatment effects we take a look at 
whether there is a remaining difference between the firm characteristics for subsidised and 
non-subsidised employees and for the two subsidies respectively if individual characteristics 
have been accounted for through propensity score matching. Since we rely on register data, 
we have only limited information available on the employing firms. For the decomposition 
analysis we can use information on the industry to which the firm belongs, the average wage 
paid by the firm, the share of low-skilled employment, and firm size.  
Table 2 contrasts the averages of the firm characteristics in the treatment and control groups 
with the estimated treatment effects. It shows that there are significant differences between 
the different kinds of subsidies and the unsubsidised employees respectively. The positive aver-
age treatment effect of the wage subsidy is accompanied by employment in firms with lower 
average wages, a smaller share of low-skilled employees and smaller firm size11 of the wage 
subsidy recipients. The effect of wage subsidies compared to in-work benefits on average goes 
along with wage subsidy recipients working in firms with higher average wages than the re-
cipients of in-work benefits, but lower share of skilled labour and smaller firm size.  
Table 2 
Pairwise treatment effects and difference in firm characteristics after matching individual 
characteristics 
Average firm wage Share of low skilled Firm size 
Comparison 
Treatment  
effect 
(t-value) 
Treat-
ment Control 
Treat-
ment Control 
Treat-
ment Control 
ws vs. not    0.13*** 52,76 56.59 0.12 0.16 69.3 212.8 
ws vs. iwb    0.094*** 47,36 40,43 0.12 0.19 76,3 151.8 
iwb vs. not    0.024 40.97 50.26 0.19 0.19 173.6 233.3 
iwb vs. ws   -0.115*** 40.31 47.95 0.19 0.12 149.6 80.5 
ws: wage subsidy; iwb: in-work benefit; not: no treatment 
Single nearest neighbour matching without replacement and calliper of 0.001; linear propensity score; 
single person households only 
Numbers in italics indicate, that the difference between treatment and control group is statistically not 
significant at the 10% level  
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
 
                                               
11  We do not present the differences in industry sectors (10 dummy variables) here to prevent our tables 
from becoming too crowded. The full table is available from the authors on request. 
IAB-Discussion Paper 18/2008 18 
Despite the fact that there is no treatment effect of in-work benefits, its recipients tend to 
work in firms with average firm wages that are lower than those for non-subsidised employ-
ees. However, there is no significant difference in the share of low skilled or in firm size. The 
differences in firm characteristics revealed by a comparison of in-work benefit to wage subsidy 
recipients mirror those of the reverse comparison.  
Having shown that there are significant differences in firm characteristics even after the 
matching, this does not necessarily mean that they are responsible for the observed treatment 
effects (or any missing effect). Therefore the decomposition analysis is performed next. The 
logistic regressions for computing the vectors kβˆ  and lβˆ  respectively are shown in the ap-
pendix (Table 6). 
Table 3 again reports the pair-wise average treatment effects of receiving a wage subsidy, an 
in-work benefit or no subsidy at all. For each treatment effect we report the results of a de-
composition using equations (eq1) and (eq2). They give the absolute amount of the treatment 
effect  that is explained by the respective firm characteristics. Sensitivity checks indicate that 
the order in which the variables enter the decomposition has no influence the results. 
Table 3 
Decomposition of the pairwise treatment effects 
Comparison Treatment effect 
Industry 
sectors 
Average 
wage 
Share of  
low skilled Firm size  
0.009*** -0.006*** 0.004*** -0.007*** eq1 ws vs. not  0.13***  0.016*** -0.013*** 0.001 -0.001 eq2 
-0.002 0.024*** 0.007 -0.018** eq1 ws vs. iwb  0.094*** 0.007 0.021** 0.006 0.001 eq2 
-0.013 -0.015 0.002 0.001 eq1 iwb vs. not  0.024  0.000 -0.020** 0.000 -0.001*** eq2 
-0.023 -0.031*** -0.005 -0.001 eq1 iwb vs. ws -0.115*** 0.014 -0.017** -0.007 0.002 eq2 
Ws: wage subsidy; iwb: in-work benefit; not: no treatment 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
 
When comparing wage subsidised with non subsidised employment, differences in the industry 
sectors of employment contribute significantly to the positive treatment effect of wage subsi-
dies. Depending on which variant is used for the decomposition, between 1 and 1.6 percentage 
points of the effect can be attributed to the sorting into different industry sectors. The oppo-
site is the case for differences in the average firm wage. If not for such differences, the treat-
ment effect of wage subsidies would be between 0.6 and 1.3 percentage points higher. As for 
the share of low skilled and the firm size, results differ between (eq1) and (eq2), so we cannot 
be sure if there really is an influence of these firm characteristics.  
When compared to in-work benefits, the effect of wage subsidies is to a large and significant 
part due to differences in the average wage in firms, where the two kinds of subsidised indi-
viduals work. More than 2 percentage points of the treatment effect of 9.4 percentage points, 
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this amounts to more than 20 percent, can be explained by such differences. Among the other 
firm characteristics only the firm size has a significant effect, but this holds only for decompo-
sition equation (eq1). 
For in-work benefits there is no significant effect on employment stability compared to non 
subsidised employment. However, at least according to results based on (eq2), without the 
sorting into firms of smaller firm size and lower average wage matters could be worse. Re-
gardless of the decomposition variant, compared to wage subsidies, lower average firm wages 
explain a significant part of the negative treatment effect of in-work benefits. 
So, to sum up, even though some results vary between the two variants of the decomposition, 
a clear pattern emerges for some of the variables. Above all, differences in the average firm 
wage are important for explaining part of the success or failure of the active labour market 
programmes wage subsidy and in-work benefit, since across all but one of the comparisons 
and for the two different decomposition variants, the explained part is always significantly 
different from zero. As for the other variables, their effect depends on which reference group is 
used for the decomposition. A notable exception is the industry sector variable in the decom-
position of the wage subsidy versus no treatment comparison. 
In section 3.2.2 we pointed out, that because of the nonlinearity of the regressions that are 
used here to compute the decomposition one might consider the logistic regression misspeci-
fied, if the x-variables are left out. Including them, however, does not change our results sub-
stantially. In all but one case individual characteristics do not contribute significantly to the 
treatment effect. In the case of “ws vs. iwb” there is a significant contribution, but it remains 
rather small (-0.5 of 9.4 percentage points). Including the x-variables mostly does not change 
the effect of the firm characteristics substantially. An exception is (eq2) of the comparison 
“iwb vs. not”, where the significance of the effects disappear, thereby leading to similar results 
consistent with (eq1) of the same comparison. 
5 Conclusions 
For some instruments of ALMP programme participation always has to coincide with finding 
employment, so it always takes place in a certain firm-specific context. Since the receipt of a 
subsidy has an influence on which specific firms are regarded as possible employers, it is not 
quite clear, to what extent positive or negative programme effects on labour market integra-
tion depend on the specific characteristics of the firms that employ subsidised individuals. To 
shed light on this question we conducted a two step analysis, firstly computing the average 
treatment effect on the treated and secondly decomposing this effect with regard to the char-
acteristics of the firms in which the subsidised and unsubsidised persons are employed.  
The results from our analysis lead to the conclusion that firm characteristics do have an influ-
ence on the success of employment subsidies. They can strengthen positive effects or mitigate 
negative effects. However, the part of the treatment effects that is explained by firm charac-
teristics ranges from very small to a considerable 52 percent. Of the firm characteristics under 
consideration here, average firm wages have the strongest impact on programme success. 
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Lower average firm wages tend to lead to lower job stability, as we can see from Table 6 in the 
appendix. Therefore, if a programme is accompanied by a sorting into firms which offer lower 
wages on average than other firms, this will reduce the effectiveness of this programme. For 
example, although wage subsidies lead to a treatment effect of about 13 percentage points 
compared to unsubsidised employment, this effect would be slightly larger (0.6 or 1.3 percent-
age points, depending on the specific decomposition) if it were not for the lower average wage 
in firms that employ workers on wage subsidies. On the other hand, the effect would be 
smaller if workers on wage subsidies were not sorted into sectors with relatively high employ-
ment stability. In-work benefits, in contrast, would be slightly less ineffective, if there were no 
sorting into firms with low average wages. 
Concerning the design and the implementation of labour market programmes, these results 
highlight the fact that the success of active labour market instruments is also influenced by 
the companies on the demand side of the labour market. So the quality of the pool of firms 
willing to employ subsidised workers is also crucial to the success of ALMP and justifies inten-
sive efforts of caseworkers to gain attractive employers. 
Finally there are two points worth mentioning. Firstly we were only able to use the firm char-
acteristics that were included in the register data. These were limited to industry sector, aver-
age firm wage, share of low-skilled workers and firm size. So we cannot rule out there being 
other aspects of the job which are important for employment stability but which could not be 
controlled here, for example workplace characteristics (e.g. Brown, McIntosh 2003). Therefore 
not all of the unexplained part of the treatment effects is necessarily to be attributed to the 
treatment(s) alone. 
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Appendix 
Table 4 
Logistic regressions for estimating the propensity scores 
 Odds Ratio (exp β ) 
 ws vs. not ws vs. iwb iwb vs. not iwb vs. ws 
Sex 1.093** 0.311*** 3.573*** 3.218*** 
Age 1.429*** 1.351*** 1.176*** 0.740*** 
Age2 0.995*** 0.996*** 0.998*** 1.005*** 
Desired working time (full time)     
No preference 1.031 0.689* 1.491* 1.451* 
Part time 0.907 0.280*** 2.753*** 3.574*** 
participation in short term training in last 7 
years: yes 1.775*** 1.122** 1.306*** 0.891** 
work experience (caseworker’s assessment): yes 0.984 0.834* 1.237** 1.199* 
participation in EGZ in  last 7 years 1.257*** 1.750** 0.585** 0.571** 
participation in a job creation measure in last 7 
years 0.762 0.717*** 1.018 1.395*** 
participation in a further training measure in last 
7 years 1.156*** 0.919 1.115 1.088 
duration of past unemployment spell 1.002*** 0.998*** 1.001** 1.002*** 
duration of past unemployment spell2 1.000*** 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Not German citizen 0.919 0.781 1.282 1.280 
Qualification level (caseworker’s assessment): top 
executive;      
workers with university degrees;  0.828 1.943 0.649 0.515 
workers with other higher education qualifications;  1.140 10.509** 0.136* 0.095** 
skilled workers with technical college qualifica-
tions;  1.166 3.776 0.486 0.265 
workers with specialised knowledge 1.061 1.266 1.335 0.790 
workers without specialised knowledge 0.768 0.711 1.583 1.407 
days in employment in last 7 years (cumulated) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
days in employment in last 7 years (cumulated)2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
days in measurement in last 7 years (cumulated) 1.001*** 1.000 1.001** 1.000 
days in measurement in last 7 years (cumulated)2 1.000*** 1.000 1.000 1.000 
reason for cancelation of last employment  
(employer)     
employee 1.085 0.802 1.055 1.246 
cancelation agreement 1.106 0.479*** 1.709** 2.089*** 
limitation 0.839*** 0.918 0.750** 1.089 
Not canceled 1.128 0.691 1.617 1.447 
other 1.000 1.600 0.714 0.625 
not known 1.025 0.853 1.055 1.172 
Wage (last job) 0.996*** 1.017*** 0.983*** 0.983*** 
Wage (last job)2 1.000 1.000*** 1.000 1.000*** 
Average wage in firm (last job) 1.001 1.009*** 0.993*** 0.991*** 
Average wage in firm (last job) 2 1.000 1.000** 1.000* 1.000** 
Firm size (last job) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Share of unskilled in firm (last job) 0.964 0.822 1.066 1.217 
Health problems (caseworker’s assessment) 0.904 0.562*** 1.422** 1.778*** 
Social security benefit (unemployment benefit)     
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 Odds Ratio (exp β ) 
 ws vs. not ws vs. iwb iwb vs. not iwb vs. ws 
Unemployment assistance 0.623*** 0.380*** 1.882*** 2.634*** 
Maintenance allowance 1.098 1.607 0.913 0.622 
Region classification I (Population Density): Core 
cities in regions with major agglomerations     
Very densely populated districts in regions 
with major agglomerations 1.364*** 1.433* 0.795 0.698** 
Densely populated districts in regions with 
major agglomerations 1.408*** 1.589** 0.857 0.629** 
Rurally structured districts in regions with 
major agglomerations 1.378*** 0.984 1.336 1.016 
Core cities in regions with conurbational 
features 1.101 0.674*** 1.430** 1.483*** 
Densely populated districts in regions with 
conurbational features 1.594*** 1.546*** 0.967 0.647*** 
Rurally structured districts in regions with 
conurbational features 1.510*** 1.725*** 0.910 0.580*** 
Densely populated districts in rurally 
structured regions 1.293*** 1.371* 0.956 0.729* 
Rurally structured districts in rurally structured 
regions 1.268*** 2.033*** 0.523*** 0.492*** 
unknown 1.042 1.008 0.895 0.992 
Region classification II (Labour Market): Areas 
mainly in eastern Germany with a dominant job 
deficit 
    
Areas characterised by big cities, mainly in western 
Germany, with high unemployment 1.473*** 1.677*** 0.954 0.596*** 
Areas in western Germany with average unem-
ployment 0.672*** 0.958 0.798** 1.044 
Centres in western Germany with a good labour 
market situation and strong dynamics 1.267** 1.367 1.497 0.732 
Areas in western Germany with a good labour 
market situation and strong dynamics 0.528*** 0.764** 0.843 1.308** 
Region classification I according to Görmar, Irmen (1991), classification II according to Blien et al. 2007 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
cases 19973 12355 9315 12355 
Pseudo R2 0.0913 0.2461 0.1966   0.2461 
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
IAB-Discussion Paper 18/2008 26 
Figure 2 
Common support wage subsidy vs. no treatment 
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Figure 3 
Common support wage subsidy vs. in-work benefit 
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
-5 0 5 -5 0 5
(1) treated  in CS . (3) treated off CS
(2) control in CS (4) control (not used)
D
e
n
si
ty
linear propensity score
Graphs by subgroups
 
 
 
IAB-Discussion Paper 18/2008 27 
Figure 4 
Common support in-work benefit vs. no treatment 
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Figure 5 
Common support in-work benefit vs. wage subsidy  
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Table 5 
T-test for equality of means in the unmatched and matched sample 
  ws vs not ws vs iwb iwb vs not iwb vs ws 
 t p t p t p t p 
Sex unmatched -2.26 0.024 -20.23 0.000 19.07 0.000 20.23 0.000 
  matched 0.08 0.936 -1.18 0.239 -0.29 0.775 1.06 0.288 
Age unmatched 4.83 0.000 -6.94 0.000 7.68 0.000 6.94 0.000 
  matched -0.23 0.815 1.74 0.082 -0.48 0.630 -0.74 0.461 
Age2 unmatched 0.79 0.429 -9.02 0.000 7.70 0.000 9.02 0.000 
  matched -0.00 0.996 1.73 0.083 -0.37 0.710 -0.79 0.432 
Desired working time: full time unmatched 1.16 0.244 11.99 0.000 -10.86 0.000 -11.99 0.000 
  matched 0.19 0.846 -0.45 0.655 -0.97 0.334 0.45 0.655 
No preference unmatched -0.47 0.637 -6.56 0.000 6.62 0.000 6.56 0.000 
  matched -0.24 0.814 0.18 0.856 0.55 0.586 -0.00 1.000 
Part time unmatched -1.38 0.168 -11.37 0.000 9.04 0.000 11.37 0.000 
  matched 0.00 1.000 0.50 0.615 0.82 0.410 -0.73 0.464 
participation in short term  
training in last 7 years: yes unmatched 25.80 0.000 -0.06 0.955 11.95 0.000 0.06 0.955 
  matched 1.53 0.126 0.16 0.874 1.10 0.272 0.20 0.841 
work experience (caseworker’s 
assessment): yes unmatched -4.74 0.000 -3.98 0.000 1.85 0.065 3.98 0.000 
  matched 0.41 0.681 -0.41 0.680 0.46 0.644 1.76 0.079 
participation in EGZ in last 7 
years unmatched 8.05 0.000 3.25 0.001 -0.54 0.587 -3.25 0.001 
  matched -0.19 0.848 0.44 0.663 0.99 0.324 -0.58 0.565 
participation in a job creation 
measure in  last 7 years unmatched 0.30 0.767 -6.32 0.000 6.52 0.000 6.32 0.000 
  matched 1.06 0.291 0.83 0.408 -1.39 0.164 -1.45 0.148 
participation in a further training 
measure in last 7 years unmatched 13.33 0.000 -3.14 0.002 9.53 0.000 3.14 0.002 
  matched 0.14 0.886 0.54 0.589 0.11 0.914 -0.45 0.651 
duration of past unemployment 
spell unmatched 2.85 0.004 -20.80 0.000 17.72 0.000 20.80 0.000 
  matched -1.26 0.209 0.46 0.643 -0.06 0.954 -0.87 0.383 
duration of past unemployment 
spell2 unmatched -4.01 0.000 -16.86 0.000 12.58 0.000 16.86 0.000 
  matched -3.47 0.001 -0.40 0.688 0.25 0.803 0.16 0.876 
Not German citizen unmatched -4.81 0.000 -3.36 0.001 1.30 0.195 3.36 0.001 
  matched 0.44 0.658 0.58 0.563 -0.41 0.684 -0.15 0.882 
workers with university degrees;  unmatched -0.26 0.792 2.61 0.009 -2.76 0.006 -2.61 0.009 
  matched 0.27 0.787 0.63 0.528 -0.90 0.368 -0.22 0.826 
workers with other higher educa-
tion qualifications;  unmatched 2.55 0.011 4.15 0.000 -3.57 0.000 -4.15 0.000 
  matched 0.47 0.636 0.45 0.654 . . 0.58 0.564 
skilled workers with technical 
college qualifications;  unmatched 2.12 0.034 4.60 0.000 -4.11 0.000 -4.60 0.000 
  matched -0.34 0.734 0.28 0.781 0.28 0.781 -0.28 0.781 
workers with specialised  
knowledge unmatched 8.82 0.000 8.44 0.000 -4.80 0.000 -8.44 0.000 
  matched -1.05 0.296 -0.55 0.579 -0.95 0.345 0.56 0.578 
workers without specialised 
knowledge unmatched -11.38 0.000 -14.40 0.000 8.98 0.000 14.40 0.000 
  matched 0.97 0.330 0.32 0.752 1.20 0.229 -0.51 0.612 
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  ws vs not ws vs iwb iwb vs not iwb vs ws 
 t p t p t p t p 
days in employment in last 7 
years (cumulated) unmatched 8.88 0.000 17.81 0.000 -13.78 0.000 -17.81 0.000 
  matched -1.55 0.120 -1.13 0.258 -0.19 0.852 0.44 0.660 
days in employment in last 7 
years (cumulated)2 unmatched 8.12 0.000 15.85 0.000 -12.63 0.000 -15.85 0.000 
  matched -1.39 0.166 -1.03 0.304 0.25 0.800 0.36 0.722 
days in measurement in last 7 
years (cumulated) unmatched 13.78 0.000 -5.20 0.000 11.64 0.000 5.20 0.000 
  matched 0.57 0.569 0.40 0.690 -0.03 0.975 -0.55 0.585 
days in measurement in last 7 
years (cumulated)2 unmatched 7.33 0.000 -4.63 0.000 7.06 0.000 4.63 0.000 
  matched 0.56 0.575 -0.04 0.972 -0.29 0.773 -0.26 0.796 
reason for cancelation of last 
employment: employer unmatched 2.83 0.005 7.99 0.000 -6.66 0.000 -7.99 0.000 
  matched -0.95 0.343 0.24 0.811 0.41 0.680 0.91 0.365 
employee unmatched 1.30 0.194 -0.47 0.635 0.83 0.407 0.47 0.635 
  matched 0.48 0.628 0.27 0.788 0.97 0.334 -0.52 0.602 
cancelation agreement unmatched 0.03 0.978 -1.61 0.107 1.76 0.079 1.61 0.107 
  matched 0.54 0.590 0.86 0.391 0.41 0.680 -1.20 0.230 
limitation unmatched -8.47 0.000 -1.65 0.098 -1.61 0.108 1.65 0.098 
  matched 0.70 0.483 0.16 0.875 -1.30 0.194 -1.07 0.286 
Not canceled unmatched 0.83 0.407 0.27 0.791 -0.01 0.996 -0.27 0.791 
  matched -0.54 0.588 -1.52 0.130 0.00 1.000 0.84 0.403 
other unmatched 0.16 0.871 1.59 0.111 -1.28 0.201 -1.59 0.111 
  matched -0.00 1.000 -0.45 0.654 0.38 0.705 -0.38 0.705 
not known unmatched 3.00 0.003 -7.43 0.000 8.46 0.000 7.43 0.000 
  matched 0.23 0.821 -0.44 0.661 0.06 0.952 0.50 0.614 
Wage (last job) unmatched -0.19 0.853 12.38 0.000 -16.05 0.000 -12.38 0.000 
  matched -0.36 0.720 0.62 0.535 0.58 0.561 -1.09 0.275 
Wage (last job)2 unmatched 0.67 0.500 0.94 0.346 -10.70 0.000 -0.94 0.346 
  matched 0.07 0.944 -0.38 0.704 0.59 0.554 0.41 0.682 
Average wage in firm (last job) unmatched -3.10 0.002 7.19 0.000 -8.30 0.000 -7.19 0.000 
  matched 0.19 0.847 0.35 0.728 -0.23 0.818 -0.01 0.991 
Average wage in firm (last job)2 unmatched -2.53 0.011 3.99 0.000 -4.37 0.000 -3.99 0.000 
  matched 0.41 0.685 -0.11 0.911 -0.13 0.897 0.44 0.664 
Firm size (last job) unmatched -2.18 0.029 0.89 0.371 -1.64 0.101 -0.89 0.371 
  matched 0.30 0.760 1.11 0.267 -0.16 0.871 1.29 0.196 
Share of unskilled in firm  
(last job) unmatched -7.54 0.000 -5.45 0.000 2.19 0.028 5.45 0.000 
  matched -0.20 0.840 -0.40 0.689 0.69 0.491 0.66 0.512 
Health problems (caseworker’s 
assessment) unmatched -2.64 0.008 -10.40 0.000 8.46 0.000 10.40 0.000 
  matched -0.29 0.772 -0.64 0.524 0.11 0.915 0.37 0.710 
Social security benefit: unem-
ployment benefit unmatched 1.23 0.218 21.10 0.000 -20.38 0.000 -21.10 0.000 
  matched 0.00 1.000 -1.43 0.153 0.58 0.563 0.60 0.549 
Unemployment assistance unmatched -3.02 0.003 -22.64 0.000 20.79 0.000 22.64 0.000 
  matched -0.09 0.928 1.56 0.120 -0.47 0.642 -0.48 0.629 
Maintenance allowance unmatched 4.89 0.000 1.64 0.102 0.15 0.878 -1.64 0.102 
  matched 0.27 0.787 -0.45 0.652 -0.50 0.615 -0.41 0.680 
Region classification I (Popula-
tion Density): Core cities in  
regions with major agglomerations 
unmatched -2.65 0.008 -2.68 0.007 1.77 0.076 2.68 0.007 
 matched 1.28 0.202 -2.40 0.017 -0.78 0.434 0.23 0.820 
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  ws vs not ws vs iwb iwb vs not iwb vs ws 
 t p t p t p t p 
Very densely populated districts in 
regions with major agglomerations unmatched -2.59 0.010 1.17 0.242 -2.30 0.022 -1.17 0.242 
 matched 0.16 0.871 0.00 1.000 0.66 0.511 0.12 0.903 
Densely populated districts in 
regions with major agglomerations unmatched 0.85 0.396 1.08 0.280 -1.03 0.305 -1.08 0.280 
 matched 0.94 0.346 0.23 0.817 0.64 0.524 -0.56 0.578 
Rurally structured districts in 
regions with major agglomerations unmatched 1.61 0.108 -1.69 0.090 2.30 0.022 1.69 0.090 
 matched -0.42 0.671 0.45 0.654 0.13 0.900 -0.34 0.733 
Core cities in regions with conur-
bational features unmatched -3.59 0.000 -8.37 0.000 6.53 0.000 8.37 0.000 
 matched -0.28 0.780 -0.42 0.674 0.48 0.632 0.25 0.800 
Densely populated districts in 
regions with conurbational  
features 
unmatched 2.30 0.021 2.74 0.006 -1.65 0.099 -2.74 0.006 
 matched -0.62 0.538 0.39 0.697 0.38 0.703 0.31 0.754 
Rurally structured districts in 
regions with conurbational  
features 
unmatched 3.20 0.001 2.47 0.014 -1.40 0.160 -2.47 0.014 
 matched -0.83 0.408 1.03 0.304 -0.39 0.697 0.29 0.768 
Densely populated districts in 
rurally structured regions unmatched -1.31 0.189 0.48 0.629 -0.99 0.325 -0.48 0.629 
 matched -0.24 0.812 1.12 0.261 0.09 0.926 -0.86 0.391 
Rurally structured districts in 
rurally structured regions unmatched 0.18 0.855 3.89 0.000 -3.84 0.000 -3.89 0.000 
 matched -0.07 0.947 -0.66 0.511 -0.97 0.331 0.00 1.000 
unknown unmatched 2.88 0.004 0.27 0.784 0.79 0.427 -0.27 0.784 
 matched 0.00 1.000 0.92 0.357 -0.16 0.874 0.51 0.607 
Region classification II (Labour 
Market): Areas mainly in eastern 
Germany with a dominant job 
deficit 
unmatched 15.19 0.000 2.53 0.011 3.72 0.000 -2.53 0.011 
 matched -0.61 0.539 0.29 0.768 -0.46 0.646 -0.12 0.906 
Areas characterised by big cities, 
mainly in western Germany, with 
high unemployment 
unmatched 8.19 0.000 1.68 0.093 1.67 0.095 -1.68 0.093 
 matched 0.75 0.455 1.12 0.265 -0.20 0.840 -0.21 0.833 
Areas in western Germany with 
average unemployment unmatched -8.81 0.000 -1.28 0.200 -2.28 0.022 1.28 0.200 
 matched 0.10 0.921 -1.17 0.242 -0.06 0.949 0.68 0.498 
Centres in western Germany with 
a good labour market situation 
and strong dynamics 
unmatched 2.17 0.030 -0.04 0.964 1.04 0.297 0.04 0.964 
 matched 0.47 0.636 -0.94 0.347 0.35 0.728 -0.81 0.416 
Areas in western Germany with a 
good labour market situation 
and strong dynamics 
unmatched -16.78 0.000 -3.54 0.000 -3.29 0.001 3.54 0.000 
 matched -0.07 0.944 0.48 0.633 0.70 0.486 -0.08 0.936 
Mean standardised bias unmatched 6.65 19.63 20.06 19.63 
 matched 0.88 3.77 2.68 3.15 
Pseudo R2 unmatched 0.090 0.246 0.199 0.246 
 matched 0.002 0.024 0.012 0.024 
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Table 6 
Logistic regressions for estimating the coefficients kβ  and lβ  for the decomposition 
analysis in the matched samples 
 ws vs. not ws vs. iwb  iwb vs. not  iwb vs. ws 
 ws not ws iwb iwb not iwb ws 
Industry Sectors (Nace)         
0 0.466** 1.043*** -0.507 -1.214 -0.874 0.511 -1.046 0.402 
1 -0.231 0.490** -0.329 1.158 0.729 -0.281 1.332 -0.203 
2 0.071 0.049 -0.157 0.317 -0.042 -0.188 0.549 0.360 
R: 3         
4 0.894*** 0.865 0.644 1.506 1.171 1.161 +++ 1.173* 
5 0.229* 0.109*** -0.232 0.382 0.096 0.077 0.533 0.163 
6 0.406*** 0.169 0.348 -0.061 -0.081 0.802 0.103 -0.068 
7 0.471*** 0.592*** 0.191 0.712 0.590 0.113 0.849 0.395 
8 0.036 -0.032 -0.410 0.268 -0.056 -0.501 0.612 0.098 
9 0.320* 0.218 -0.598 -0.036 -0.053 -0.116 0.095 -0.448 
Average wage in firm -0.008*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.008 -0.010** -0.019*** -0.009** 
Share of low skilled 0.486*** 0.147 0.536 0.688 0.548 0.056 0.434 0.446 
Firm size 0.000*** 0.000 -0.002** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Constant 0.268* 1.097*** 1.256** 1.031 0.800 1.436** 0.982 0.528 
Ws: wage subsidy; iwb: in-work benefit; not: no treatment 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
+++ Industry sector 4 predicted “failure” in this estimation perfectly, the respective observations were discarded 
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